When delay defeats ground (f): Pridewell Properties (London) Limited v Spirit Pub Company (Managed) Limited [2026] EWHC 953 (Ch)

Andrew Martin examines the High Court decision in Pridewell Properties (London) Limited v Spirit Pub Company (Managed) Limited [2026] EWHC 953 (Ch), which provides important clarification for landlords opposing a new tenancy under section 30(1)(f) (ground (f)) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954.

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Introduction 

In last month’s article, I discussed how the extensive caselaw on “intention” in the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, s.30(1) (f) (ground (f)) might be applied in the context of the new Ground 1A of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1988 (as amended). Ground (f) itself, however, continues to throw up interesting legal questions, as demonstrated by the recent appeal in the High Court in the case of Pridewell Properties (London) Limited v Spirit Pub Company (Managed) Limited [2026] EWHC 953 (Ch).

The point in issue here was not “intention” per se, but what it means for a landlord to intend to demolish or reconstruct the premises “on the termination of the current tenancy”, as is required by ground (f). It is long settled that the demolition or reconstruction does not have to begin the very next day after the termination of the tenancy. If there is some leeway afforded to landlords, though, how is it to be determined what is a permissible period of time and what is not? This is the question considered by Fancourt J (the judge) in Pridewell.

The decisions at first instance and on appeal.

The case concerned a pub in South Woodford in East London. The main area of the pub was located on the ground floor, with upper floors used for various purposes by the pub and a large beer garden outside. The landlord relied on ground (f) to oppose the grant of a new tenancy of the pub on the basis of a scheme it had devised. That scheme proposed building three new mews houses in the area used as the pub’s beer garden, reconstructing and extending the existing building to provide for a pub on the ground floor (with a smaller garden terrace to the rear) and six self-contained flats on the upper floors.

Unusually, the landlord had not, before trial, even applied for, let alone obtained, planning permission for this scheme. That did not prove to be the critical factor in the case, though. HHJ Hellman (the circuit judge) decided that the landlord had not made out its ground of opposition because it had failed to prove a real chance that its directors would provide guarantees of sufficient value to support its borrowing to fund the scheme. The landlord appealed against this decision. The judge dismissed the appeal, holding that the circuit judge had not erred in making this finding. This disposed of the appeal; however, the tenant had filed a respondent’s notice contending that the circuit judge’s decision should be upheld, contrary to his conclusions, on four different grounds, which were considered by the judge.

“On the termination of the current tenancy”

One of the grounds in the respondent’s notice was that the landlord did not intend to start the works on the termination of the current tenancy. The circuit judge had considered that the works would start between 10 and 14 months from the possession date, and that this was a reasonable time such as to satisfy the condition under ground (f) that there is an intention to carry out the works “on the termination of the current tenancy”. The judge noted that ground (f) does not state that the works must be started “within a reasonable time, or at any particular time” but on the termination of the tenancy. The landlord must therefore intend to carry out the works at that time, not at a later time.

The judge then considered the caselaw addressing this point, commenting that it had “created some leeway as regards the literal requirement that the works be intended to be done at the termination of the tenancy”. In Reohorn v Barry Corporation [1956] 1 WLR 845, Birkett LJ stated that he did not think it meant that ‘the bulldozers would arrive the next day’, but it does mean that “the work will begin, not at any long delayed time, but on the termination of the tenancy”. In Fisher v Taylor’s Furnishing Stores Ltd [1956] 2 QB 78, Denning LJ put it in the following terms: “it is intended to do the works at once and not after a time”. In Edwards v Thompson [1990] 60 P&CR 526, the Court of Appeal had considered an inability to carry out the work within a few months of the possession date not to satisfy the statutory test. In Method Development Ltd v Jones [1971] 1 WLR 168, the test was formulated for the first time as being “within a reasonable time from the date of its termination” (in the context of s.30(1)(g), which uses the same language of “on the termination of the current tenancy”). In London Hilton Jewellers Ltd v Hilton International Hotels Ltd [1990] 1 EGLR 112 (also a ground (g) case), the Court of Appeal held that a delay of a month or so was permissible and what was a reasonable time was a question of fact in each case. Finally, the judge cited the decision of the High Court in S Franses Ltd v Cavendish Hotel (London) Ltd [2017] EWHC 1670 (QB), in which Jay J had allowed the tenant’s appeal on the basis that the judge had afforded the landlord an unusually generous period – 12 months in that case – without providing an adequate explanation for it. Jay J emphasised that the question is “very much fact-sensitive”.

The judge then turned to the circuit judge’s reasoning in this case, and the arguments on appeal. He concluded that the test the circuit judge had applied was subtly wrong: he had asked whether the landlord’s estimation of the length of the delay was reasonable in the sense of being justified, when in fact the question was whether the landlord intended to carry out the works a reasonable time after the termination of the tenancy. Put another way, it would be possible that a reasonable and justified estimate of the likely delay could exceed a reasonable time beyond the termination date, and therefore ground (f) would not be made out.

In reaching this conclusion, the judge commented on how the “reasonable time” might be determined. He emphasised that it will be “property- (and other circumstance-) specific”. Time should be allowed for, e.g., recovering, securing, and clearing out the property, mobilising contractors, and taking other preliminary steps. What is reasonable here will be dependent on the size, condition, location, and particular circumstances of the holding. The key, the judge held, as indicated by the statutory language, is in what the landlord intends to do and when he intends to do it. If the landlord intends to use the property for something else, or to leave it empty for a period, or cannot commence the works because something else needs to be done first, it cannot be said to intend to do the works on termination of the tenancy.

The problem for the landlord in this case was that significant steps were to be taken after the possession date before the works could start. The judge made it clear that a lack of planning permission at the hearing date would not necessarily mean that a landlord’s ground (f) challenge would fail on this basis, but in this case, the landlord only planned to apply for a contentious planning permission six to seven months after the possession date, which would result in the works only starting after a substantial time. The judge therefore held that the landlord’s opposition to the grant of a new tenancy ought to have failed on this basis too.

Comment

It is important to be clear about exactly what this line of authority establishes. When the judge referred to the “literal requirement that the works be intended to be done at the termination of the tenancy” or “the statutory tolerance”, this should not be understood as indicating that the court is granting an indulgence in breaching a statutory time-limit. If that were the case, it is difficult to see how it could be reconciled with the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v Ridley [2025] A.C.1155. That case concerned the interpretation of the statutory deadline for making an application for adverse possession under the Land Registration Act 2002, Sch. 6, paragraph 5(4) i.e. the “boundary exception”. As part of this, the Supreme Court considered whether an applicant could be afforded a grace period after the deadline for making the application on the basis of the de minimis principle, and decided that they could not for several reasons. One of those was that it was by no means clear that the de minimis principle has ever been used as a means of conferring extra time to do something in excess of a statutory time limit. Therefore this clearly cannot be the case in the context of the 1954 Act either. What the courts have tried to do is to identify what can be sensibly meant by “on the termination of the current tenancy the landlord intends to demolish or reconstruct…”. They have not construed “on the termination of the current tenancy” as “at the very moment of the termination of the current tenancy”; this would render ground (f) illusory as a ground of opposition. At the same time, however, there is clearly a temporal link with the termination of the tenancy which cannot sensibly ignored. Hence “within a reasonable time of the termination of the tenancy” has proved a useful gloss of the statutory language, in that it preserves a time element, without making it into a hard deadline.

As the judge made clear, as supported by the authorities, this is inevitably a fact-sensitive exercise. There does seem to be a very thin line, however, between taking into account the specific property and circumstances in determining what is “a reasonable time”, and falling into the error that the circuit judge made, namely determining whether the delay in starting the works was reasonable (in the sense of being justified) in the circumstances. In this case, the fact that the tenant denied the landlord access to the premises meant that the landlord could not progress the planning process prior to termination of the tenancy, hence the finding that there would be a considerable delay and uncertainty. Such a delay was clearly justifiable – there was nothing else the landlord could realistically do – but was not considered a circumstance relevant to determining what was a “reasonable time”. The size or location of the property, for example, could be, however. It appears there is particular significance in there being uncertainty in the delay. If the landlord, as here, could only embark on a contentious planning application some time after the termination of the tenancy, in reality the works would be carried out on the overcoming of that obstacle, not on the termination of the tenancy, and hence the statutory test is not met. Even without an element of uncertainty, though, it seems that a lengthy delay may in itself stretch the temporal link to breaking point, but again, this is subject to particular circumstances rendering such a delay reasonable. While, therefore, it is not possible to set out the test with greater specificity, it is worth noting Jay J’s comment, as cited by the judge, that the more unusual a finding, the greater the duty must be on the court to explain it. This, in turn, places a significant duty on landlords to show that an unusually lengthy delay to the commencement of works is still a “within a reasonable time” after the termination of the tenancy.

It should be noted that this is not the end of the road for landlords who wish to take back possession of their properties to redevelop them. Even if a landlord were to find itself, as the landlord did in this case, unable to show it intended to carry out the works within a reasonable time, it is not without options. The landlord might also seek to avail itself of the “near miss” provision in s.31(2) of the 1954 Act. As the judge also noted, the landlord could argue for a 1-year or shorter term, or for the inclusion of a redevelopment break clause in the new lease.

This article was first published in the Practical Law’s Property Litigation Column.