Numerous lenders and other stakeholders have found themselves in the position of
$1.2 Billion Bankruptcy Petition

Today the Court handed down judgment in the case of Mobile Telecommunications Company KSPC v HRH Prince Hussam bin Saud bin Abdulaziz al Saud [2025] EWHC 85 (Ch)
The bankruptcy petition in this case centred on an alleged debt (and interest) of c.$1.2 Billion, arising from an arbitration award relating to establishing Zain telecom in Saudi Arabia. To succeed, the petitioner (“MTC”) had to establish one of the grounds for jurisdiction set out in s.265 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “1986 Act”). MTC relied upon only one of the grounds: that HRH Prince Hussam bin Saud bin Abdulaziz al Saud (“Prince Hussam”) had a place of residence in England and Wales in the three years prior to the presentation of the Petition. In this case, that period (the “Relevant Period”) was 1st June 2019 and 1st June 2022.
Prior to Marc and Hugh being instructed on the case, the issue of jurisdiction had been considered by five judges sitting in the High Court (twice on appeal). At each turn the Court had concluded, on a good arguable case basis, that Prince Hussam had a place of residence in England and Wales for the purposes of section 265(2)(b)(i) of the 1986 Act.
It was not in contention that Prince Hussam (a) is not the legal owner of any residence in the jurisdiction and (b) did not set foot in the jurisdiction (let alone in a residence) during the Relevant Period.
The Court was therefore required to evaluate whether or not the residency condition was met on the basis of Prince Hussam’s connection with various properties in the jurisdiction owned by his family (“the London Properties”). Of particular relevance was Prince Hussam’s status as an Emir, and socio-religious sensibilities relating to who is allowed to stay when and where and with whom, in the London Properties.
After a detailed consideration of the intricate web of case law in this area, ICC Judge Briggs provided the following distillation of the relevant principles:
i. Section 265 IA 1986 ought to be considered in the context of producing an interpretation of the reason for the court assuming jurisdiction to administer a foreigner’s affairs;
ii. A debtor may have a legal or beneficial interest in a property but not be resident;
iii. The express use of residence for the purpose of grounding jurisdiction in legislation, whether it be “ordinarily” resident or a place of “residence” is a tool used in many statutes in diverse areas of law over many years. It is not a term of art. It requires the court to make findings of fact to the extent that the person had a settled purpose for residing, such aseducation, business or profession, employment, health, family, or merely love of the place;
iv. To be resident or to have had a residence requires a petitioner to show there is or has been “a degree of permanence” and “continuity” or “expectation of continuity”; and
v. A debtor’s intention helps inform the court in determining the facts of any case. Intention is to be judged objectively.
Ultimately, it was considered that the test is one of “fact and degree” which “depends on all of the evidence”.
One point of note is that the Petitioner argued that once an individual is found to have a residence, he may not quit his residence: The only path open to an individual is to demonstrate “abandonment”. This argument was ultimately rejected, with the Court holding that there is no legal, intellectual or logical reason why a person should not be found to have had a place of residence at one point in time and not at another: The only question is whether the evidence is sufficient to establish that the person had a place of residence at the relevant time, and that burden is on the petitioner.
The Court heard from Prince Hussam himself, as well as his wife HRH Princess Sarah Bint Musaad Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (“Princess Sarah”), his mother HRH Princess Noorah Bint Abdullah Fahad AI-Damir (“Princess Noorah”) and various employees of the family. The Court held that Prince Hussam’s evidence was “honestly given and reliable”
On the facts of this case, the Court considered a number of factors as being particularly relevant to the residence test, including: the timing and purpose of the purchase of relevant properties; Prince Hussam’s occupation and Princess Noorah’s occupation; the apparent commitment of Princess Noorah to provide accommodation in London; the requirement of permission to use the relevant property; the absence of personal possessions; whether the property was a settled or usual place of abode or home; and the fact that Prince Hussam was registered for council tax.
The Court held that Prince Hussam did have a place of residence in England and Wales up to April 1990, however there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he was resident thereafter; Prince Hussam had no hold on this jurisdiction such as to make him liable under English bankruptcy law.
The concept of “residence” is a tool used in many statutes in diverse areas of law, and this judgment will form a useful touchstone to practitioners in a range of contexts as to how the concept of “residence” should be defined and applied.
A further point that arose shortly before trial related to the question of limitation and raises a number of novel issues on which there is scant authority. Prince Hussam argues that the principal arbitration sum arose more than six years ago, and the presentation of the petition in 2022 did not stop time running, so that the alleged debts are (as of shortly before the trial in November 2024) now statute-barred and cannot support the Petition. The Court adjourned argument on this issue to March 2025. However, in light of the Court’s judgment to dismiss the Petition on jurisdiction, it remains to be seen whether the Court will, or will need to, address this issue.
Marc Glover has been instructed as Prince Hussam’s lead counsel in the dispute since 2023, having taken over from John Wardell KC (Wilberforce). For this trial of the Petition, Hugh Rowan was also instructed, along with Peter Arden KC (Erskine Chambers) and Geraint Jones KC (3 Paper Buildings). The team were assisted by Sami Allan, Pupil Barrister at Tanfield Chambers. Stephen Moverly-Smith KC (XXIV) and Adam Baradon KC (Blackstone) acted on behalf of MTC.
A copy of the judgment can be found here.
This case drew media attention.